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 Valeria Marziali 
Lobbying in Brussels 
Interest Representation and Need for Information 
Introduction 
Being the centre of the institutions of the European Union (EU), Brussels 
has become over the years the second largest and most important town in 
the world after Washington D.C. for practising lobbying. Around 13,000 
lobbyists work in the Belgian capital to represent before the EU the inter-
ests of many different groups: trade and professional associations, Non-
Governmental Organizations (NGOs), trade unions, employers’ organisa-
tions, chambers of commerce, agricultural associations, regional represen-
tations, and consultancies specialised in EU matters. 
In an article published by The Washington Times Gareth Harding has 
drawn the picture of Brussels in relation to the phenomenon of lobbying: 
«there are not many growth industries in Brussels, the capital of Belgium 
and headquarters of the EU, but lobbying is definitely one of them»
1. 
Due to the institutional multi-level governance structure of the EU and to 
the weakness of the European parties, interest groups have easy and effec-
tive access to the EU institutions, particularly to the Commission, to put 
pressure on them and to influence legislation. Not only can they highlight 
their interests and try to satisfy them, but they provide the so-called “Euro-
cracy” with the necessary technical information to make and to implement 
 
1 Cf. Gareth Harding, ‘Analysis: Reining in EU Lobbyists’, The Washington Times, 8 
March 2005. Valeria Marziali 
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EU laws. In other words, the effect of lobbying in the EU is twofold: on the 
one side, pressure groups raise their priorities; on the other side, the Com-
mission receives expertise and assistance for making its job. 
The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 
represented important steps in the development of the lobbying activity in 
Brussels: following the introduction of the measures to complete the single 
market, many European and non-European business interest groups opened 
their offices in Brussels to monitor the activity of the Commission; on the 
other hand, Regions and local authorities, after the creation of the Commit-
tee of the Regions in 1992, decided to establish a representation in the Bel-
gian capital in order to be present where decisions are taken and, more im-
portantly, where the distribution of structural funds is negotiated. 
The novelties represented by the cooperation procedure and the co-decision 
procedure, introduced by the SEA and the Treaty of Maastricht respec-
tively, improved and strengthened the role of the European Parliament (EP) 
in the EU decision-making process and implied the development of the 
lobbying activity on the Parliament. 
As a consequence of these institutional transformations, since the mid-
1980s the number of interest groups has increased considerably so that their 
role within the Community process as agenda setters as well as contributors 
to the definition of the legislation has been strengthened. 
The development of lobbying has been the result of two other aspects of the 
Community legislation: not only the EU Justice takes precedence over the 
Member States legislation, but 80% of Community law is “made in Brus-
sels”
2, so that national parliaments and governments have to comply with it 
when they pass national laws. 
The subheading of this paper, Interest Representation and Need for Infor-
mation, summarises in a few words the lobbying activity carried out in the 
Belgian capital: on the one hand, groups, associations and professional 
lobbyists want to sponsor their priorities before the EU; on the other hand, 
 
2 Cf. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, Lobbying 
in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices, Luxembourg: Publications 
Service, 2003. Lobbying in Brussels 
  5
the EU institutions require information, suggestions and support in order to 
perform their functions. 
By and large the EU has benefited from lobbying. In fact, by gaining easy 
access to the EU and providing the bureaucracy and policy-makers with 
relevant information and support for the implementation of the European 
policies, interest groups have contributed during the 1980s to the realisation 
of the internal market through their input and support. 
This paper will try to show that lobbying in Brussels is a necessity for the 
functioning of the system: because of its peculiar institutional structure, the 
EU needs information from civil society in order to draft the Community 
legislation. 
This positive attitude towards lobbying activity should not induce to under-
estimate the shortcomings that it implies: not only can interest groups end 
up with representing the needs of civil society more effectively than politi-
cal parties, which theoretically should be the representatives of the Euro-
pean peoples, but there is also the risk that only some groups are taken into 
consideration by EU institutions because of their size and resources. More-
over, the questions of transparency about clients and how money is spent as 
well as the lack of compulsory codes of conduct are still there. 
Lobbying in the European Union has represented an important source of 
legitimacy because interest groups have given to the EU polices support for 
their implementation and have promoted the European integration among 
the Member States and the citizens. They have sponsored the increase in 
the EU competences to convince national governments to broaden the 
sphere of action of “Brussels” and have looked for support among their 
member associations. 
Nevertheless, lobbying has not affected the political legitimacy of the EU 
as a whole: the EU continues to derive its legitimacy from the Treaties and 
the direct elections of the EP, so that interest representation and the process 
of consultation carried out particularly by the Commission are sources of 
input to the legislative process. Lobbying can help the EU to make its job, 
but it is not a way to solve the problem of the ‘democratic deficit’. Valeria Marziali 
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This paper is divided in six parts: after having presented the main catego-
ries of actors involved in lobbying and the targets of this activity of politi-
cal pressure, it goes on to describe the reasons why interest groups lobby 
the EU. The fourth part is dedicated to the strategies and techniques of suc-
cessful lobbying, while the fifth section wants to analyse the approach 
given by the European Commission to the consultation process with inter-
est groups. The sixth part, on the contrary, focuses its attention on the ques-
tion of the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the EU and on the possibility 
that lobbying can constitute a substitute for this lack. Finally, the paper 
tries to draw some conclusions. 
1. The  Players 
The history of the European Union has been characterised over the decades 
by many “stops and gos”: there have been periods of progress and greater 
integration among the Member States as well as times of scepticism and 
retreat to national interests. 
If one looks at the decades of the European experience, the Single Euro-
pean Act of 1986 can be rightly considered to be one of the strongest ex-
amples of the will of the Member States to achieve a closer and more sig-
nificant integration. 
Under heavy pressure from business groups to relaunch the European 
economy that had lost competitiveness in comparison to Japan, North 
America and South-East Asia during the 1980s, the SEA represented the 
possibility for both big and small companies to trade without barriers and 
to make profit in a larger market. Due to the relevance of these interests 
and to the crucial role played by the European Commission in setting the 
rules to implement the internal market, Brussels soon became the lobbying 
target for many companies and trade associations. 
Another important event in the development of lobbying in the EU was the 
Treaty on the European Union (TEU) of 1992 which introduced the Com-
mittee of the Regions and the principle of subsidiarity. As a result of this, 
Brussels has seen the arrival and the establishment of many regional and Lobbying in Brussels 
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local authority offices to represent their interests directly at the heart of the 
EU. 
All these factors thus convinced interest groups of the need to be present in 
Brussels in order to: monitor legislative developments and to influence de-
cision-making procedures by the way of reports and studies, to provide in-
formation and advice to partners in the Member States about Community 
law and its application, to advance proposals to the European Commission, 
and to establish contacts with EU institutions’ staff. 
1.1  Lobbyists in Brussels 
Many actors are involved in lobbying the European Union: trade associa-
tions, business and industry groupings, chambers of commerce, trade un-
ions, Regions, public relations consultancies, law firms, think tanks, issue-
specific conferences, NGOs, non-profit organisations, and church associa-
tions. 
As far as associations are concerned, one of the most influential is the Un-
ion des Industries de la Communauté européenne (UNICE), which repre-
sents business interests and is composed of 39 national federations from 33 
countries. Its Brussels headquarters has around 45 members of staff. It co-
ordinates the seven policy committees and 60 working groups summing up 
to a total of 1,200 experts, and prepares position papers (about 100 a year) 
for the EU institutions. 
On the other hand the American Chamber of Commerce to the European 
Union (AmCham EU) promotes the interests of around 135 European com-
panies of American parentage that have manufacturing plants throughout 
the European Union. Each member company has representatives on Am-
Cham EU and takes part in the activities of the 14 committees, two task 
forces and several working groups. 
Other important interest groups include the European Round Table of In-
dustrialists (ERT), which gathers around 45 chief executive officers drawn 
from Europe’s largest firms (Nestlé, Philips, Shell, Unilever) and plays the 
role of ‘agenda setter’; the Union Européenne de l’Artisanat et des Petites 
et Moyennes Entreprises (UEAPME); and the Fédération Bancaire de Valeria Marziali 
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l’Union Européenne (FBE), which represents over 4,500 European banks 
from 27 national banking associations. 
As counterpart of UNICE, the European Trade Union Confederation 
(ETUC) defends the interests of 60 million workers and labour unionists. It 
comprises 76 member organisations from a total of 40 countries and 11 in-
dustry federations. 
EUROCHAMBRES (The Association of European Chambers of Com-
merce and Industry), on the contrary, represents 44 national associations of 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry, that is to say, a European network of 
2,000 regional and local Chambers with over 18 million member enter-
prises in Europe. 
Other groups are: the Centre Européen des Entreprises à Partecipation 
Publique et des Entreprises d’Intérêt Economique Général (CEEP) repre-
senting public-sector employers; the Conseil Européen des Professions 
Libérales (CEPLIS); EUROCADRES (Council of European Professional 
and Managerial Staff), which operates under the auspices of ETUC and 
defends salaried, unionised professional and managerial staff; and the Con-
fédération Européenne des Cadres (CEC), which represents independent 
organisations of managerial staff primarily in industry and commerce and 
is not affiliated to ETUC. 
If on the one hand the ETUC suffers from the fact that national trade un-
ions try to preserve their autonomy, so that it faces difficulties both in co-
ordinating policies across countries and in establishing an effective coun-
terweight to employers
3, the AmCham EU, on the other hand, is the most 
effective lobbying organisation based in Brussels
4: not only are its mem-
bers very large employers in Europe – thus constituting a sort of threat for 
European employment –, but they are very familiar with the practices and 
techniques they use to lobby the US government. What is more, the EU 
 
3 Cf. Grant Wyn, ‘Pressure Groups and the European Community: An Overview’, in 
Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.  
4 Cf. Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, ‘Introduction: Transference of Power, Deci-
sion Rules, Rules of the Game’, in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds.), 
Lobbying in the European Community, op. cit.  Lobbying in Brussels 
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Committee benefits from strong international links with the US industry 
business groups and American government officials. 
The largest category of EU lobbying groups is that of trade associations. 
One of the strongest and most efficiently organised is the Conseil Européen 
des Fédérations de l’Industrie Chimique (CEFIC), which represents the 
European chemical industry. The authority and influence of this organisa-
tion is derived from its relatively small membership, from the fact that it is 
well resourced and from the strategic role that the chemical industry plays 
in being affected by European legislation in environment, competition and 
trade policies. 
Another important actor at the European level is the European Federation 
of Pharmaceutical Industries and Associations (EFPIA): it includes 25 na-
tional pharmaceutical industry associations and 43 leading pharmaceutical 
companies. 
Due to the weight of the CAP over the European budget, another strong 
lobby is that related to agriculture. It is represented by the Committee of 
Professional Agricultural Organisations in the European Union (COPA): 
55 national agricultural associations from the 25 Member States are repre-
sented together with five other associated members from Bulgaria and Ro-
mania. 
As far as the societal interests are concerned, the Bureau Européen des Un-
ions de Consommateurs (BEUC) draws together 11 national consumer as-
sociations and may be considered to be one of the best resourced organisa-
tions in Brussels. 
All the groups described above are the so-called “Euro groups”: in fact, 
they are European confederations or federations whose members are na-
tional associations. In other words, they are “federations of federations” 
that represent European interests. 
Employers, workers and consumers from all over the EU have decided to 
coordinate themselves within UNICE, ETUC and BEUC respectively be-
cause, if they want to become more influential, they must take collective 
action. The more stakeholders they have behind them, the more likely they Valeria Marziali 
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gain access to the institutions. It goes without saying that an industry 
branch has more chances than a single enterprise to have its viewpoint seri-
ously considered. Moreover, in dealing with the European institutions and 
in particular with the European Commission, it is essential that interest 
groups, after having identified policy problems and developed appropriate 
solutions, can mediate with one single voice and can take a homogeneous 
position. 
Other actors involved in the lobbying activity are the permanent representa-
tions of the Member States to the European Union as well as the offices of 
the sub-national and local authorities of the EU countries. Sub-national in-
terests are promoted by the Council of European Municipalities and Re-
gions (CEMR) and the Assembly of European Regions (AER). In addition, 
Brussels hosts the delegations of third countries. 
Among the NGOs and the groups which promote social interests such as 
environment, human rights, gender equality, health sector, education, and 
social welfare the most well-known and influential are: the European Envi-
ronmental Bureau (EEB); the European Platform for Social NGOs; Green-
peace; Amnesty International; the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF); 
the European Youth Forum; and the European Women’s Lobby. 
Last but not least are think tank interest groups, which developed in Brus-
sels during the last decade reflecting the steadily increasing power of the 
European Union. Among the centres of study and research that aim to in-
fluence thinking among EU policy-makers, the main representatives are: 
the European Policy Centre (EPC), the Centre for European Policy Studies 
(CEPS), Friends of Europe, the Centre for the New Europe (CNE), and the 
European Enterprise Institute. 
To sum up, in Brussels there are five categories of interest groups: business 
(companies and trade associations), territorial (national, regional and local 
level), collective (workers, environment, consumers, human rights, women, 
etc.), public affairs consultancies (that will be dealt with in paragraph 1.3), 
and research centres. 
On the basis of the estimates made by the European Commission in the 
early 1990s, there were approximately 3,000 special interest groups of Lobbying in Brussels 
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varying types in Brussels and around 10,000 employees were working in 
the lobbying sector. More than 500 of these 3,000 groups were European 
and international federations and 50 were representations of Länder, re-
gional or local authorities. In addition, there were more than 200 individual 
firms with direct representation, about 100 consultants (management and 
public relations) and 100 law firms
5. 
Although the number of the interest groups is quite high, the most effective 
key players are large companies and EU business associations. 
1.2  The Maastricht Treaty as a turning point: the Regions come to 
Brussels 
As pointed out earlier, the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992 marked a decisive 
step in the development of lobbying in Brussels by regional and local au-
thorities. 
Since the European Union’s competences have increased over time, touch-
ing issues such as environment, industry and transportation, the impact of 
EU legislation on regional institutions has become stronger. In those policy 
areas where they have legislative powers within their respective Member 
States, Regions attempt to influence European legislation. In fact, because 
of the precedence of European law over national law, Regions are equally 
obliged to comply with regulations and directives. 
The main objective Regions have when they open an office in Brussels is 
an informational exchange. In fact, they want to be present to provide their 
partners in the Member States (regional authorities, Ministries, universities, 
business activities and NGOs) with information about incoming legisla-
tion
6. 
 
5 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, An Open and Structured Dialogue 
Between the Commission and Special Interest Groups, SEC (1992), 2272 final. 
6 Cf. Isabelle Smets, ‘Les régions se mobilisent – Quel «lobby régional» à Bruxelles?’, 
in Paul-H. Claeys, Corinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets and Pascaline Winand (eds.), 
Lobbying, Pluralism and European Integration, Brussels: European Interuniversi-
tary Press, 1998. Valeria Marziali 
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The second objective is to organise and participate in events such as semi-
nars and conferences in order to promote themselves and their territories, to 
attract investment, and to look for regional partnerships. If their lobbying is 
to be effective, it needs to be organised and requires sub-national authori-
ties not to approach European institutions individually. An example of this 
is offered by the Regions of Central Italy (Abruzzo, Lazio, Marche, To-
scana, Umbria), which in 1999 decided to establish their offices in Brussels 
in the same building at Rond Point Schuman 14. 
Regional lobbying turns to be successful if it is accompanied by the coor-
dination with the regional offices in the Member States, a good relationship 
with the national Permanent Representations to the EU, and the support 
given by the home structures. 
Lobbying activity by Regions appears to be stronger in federal and semi-
federal states such as Germany, Austria, Belgium and Spain or where Re-
gions have a strong sense of identity, language and culture. 
In short, regional offices in Brussels have several objectives: information 
gathering and dissemination through, for instance, instruments such as 
newsletters; establishment of contacts and channels to put regional officers 
in contact with EU officers and to meet the Members of the EP (MEPs) of 
the home region; the promotion of initiatives; participation in the activities 
of the Committee of the Regions; finally, the most important task according 
to Lorenza Badiello, securing funding for their Regions
7. 
1.3  The galaxy of public affairs consultancies 
Another way through which corporations or trade associations can lobby 
the EU is by resorting to third parties such as firms specialised in EU mat-
ters. The early 1990s did not only see the establishment of regional offices 
in Brussels, but also a sharp increase in the number of consultancies deal-
ing with EU affairs aimed at providing assistance to companies or associa-
tions. 
 
7 Cf. Lorenza Badiello, ‘Regional Offices in Brussels: Lobbying from the Inside’, in 
Paul-H. Claeys, Corinne Gobin, Isabelle Smets and Pascaline Winand (eds.), Lob-
bying, Pluralism and European Integration, op. cit. Lobbying in Brussels 
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According to the data collected by Christian Lahusen through interviews 
with 260 companies involved in European affairs, the sector of consultan-
cies is dominated by law firms and, to a lesser degree, by political consul-
tancies
8. The relevance of law firms is mainly due both to the role that 
European law plays in issues such as competition or business activity and 
to the precedence that it enjoys over national legislation. 
Consultancies, whose task consists in information gathering and monitoring 
services and whose role is advisory, appear to firms or associations as a 
complementary instrument and a further tool for interest representation. To 
put it differently, they limit their involvement to giving advice on how to 
influence the EU decision-making process, but they do not prevent the in-
terest groups from carrying out lobbying on their own. 
Although they serve the interests of their clients, whoever they are, they 
can be seen as a transmission belt between the European institutions, na-
tional governments and interest groups. This is even more important if one 
takes into consideration the companies which do not have the resources to 
open a liaison office in Brussels and for which consultancies may constitute 
the only reliable providers of services. 
The credibility of these private actors depends on the quality of the infor-
mation they provide. 
The biggest groups are WeberShandwick, APCO Europe, Hill & Knowlton 
International Belgium, GPC International – Government Policy Consult-
ant, Burson-Marsteller, and Blueprint Partners. 
1.4  Washington vs. Brussels 
Several elements contribute to distinguish Brussels from Washington in the 
field of lobbying: not only the style and the number of people involved in 
 
8 If the former are 151 and constitute 53%, and the latter are 86 and amount to 30.2%, 
economic and management (E&M) consultancies are 35 and represent 12.3% while 
the public relations firms are 13 and equal 4.5% of the total. Cf. Christian Lahusen, 
‘Commercial consultancies in the European Union: the shape and structure of pro-
fessional interest intermediation’, Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 5, 2002, 
pp. 695-714. Valeria Marziali 
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this activity (13,000 in the Belgian capital and 25,500 in the US capital)
9, 
but mainly the political system and the institutional structure to which the 
activity is targeted. Furthermore, the EU bureaucracy is only 2% the size of 
the US federal government and is even smaller than the local government 
of Rotterdam. 
While the US is organised as a federal state, the European Union is a set of 
Member States that have renounced some parts of sovereignty in order to 
attribute powers to supranational authorities. However, the EU is not a fed-
eral state since treaties are signed by national governments and, in order to 
enter into force, need to be ratified by all the Member States. Moreover, the 
principal decision-making body remains the Council of Ministers, which is 
made up of the ministers of the Member States. As Conor McGrath has 
pointed out, «there is no question that the way the European Union is or-
ganised has a very significant affect on how lobbying is undertaken»
10. 
The electoral campaigns are different on the two sides of the Atlantic. In 
the US candidates who decide to stand at the elections must seek political 
support and money, as there is no party discipline or candidature control. In 
the EU, on the other hand, national issues and national parties dominate 
electoral campaigns for the EP elections and MEPs look for votes in their 
constituencies. In other words, whereas the US Members of Congress con-
sider corporations, NGOs, churches and associations as their electorate, the 
MEPs keep the idea that their constituency is represented by the voters and 
not by interest groups. 
Differently to what happens in Washington, where lobbying is a long ac-
cepted tradition, and despite the ever-increasing number of interest groups, 
in Brussels it continues to be seen with suspicion and scepticism. While in 
the US companies finance electoral campaigns through the so called Politi-
cal Action Committees (PACs), in Europe this attitude is looked at as being 
incorrect and unethical. 
 
9 Estimates provided by the Association of Accredited Lobbyists to the European Par-
liament (AALEP). See the web site www.eulobby.net. 
10 See Conor McGrath, Comparative Lobbying Practices: Washington, London, Brus-
sels, Draft Paper, University of Ulster, 2002, p. 16. Lobbying in Brussels 
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Whereas the European Commission, as it will be described later on, has 
supported the creation of some interest groups by giving them money, the 
US government usually does not finance non-profit organisations. 
Another distinction is represented by the so called ‘revolving doors’: offi-
cials moving from public functions to business or interest groups and vice 
versa is less frequent in Brussels than it is in Washington. 
Finally, while lobbying in the US is regulated by law and is subject to 
transparency requirements such as the obligation for interest groups to list 
their clients, the issues they deal with and the money they receive, in 
Europe there are no compulsory codes of conduct. 
A limitation to the development in Brussels of a lobbying system closer to 
that of Washington is the presence of 20 official languages throughout the 
25 Member States: this constitutes an obvious problem not only when in-
terest groups have to approach MEPs who still want to use their native lan-
guage, but also during the translation of directives and regulations because 
of the different meaning that words can have in different languages. 
2. The  Targets 
Since the Single European Act realised the objective of the founding Trea-
ties of the free movement of goods, services, people, and capital, it was the 
first substantial change to the Treaties of Rome: not only did it create the 
internal market, but it also marked the first important revision to the institu-
tional structure of the European Community (EC) by providing the Euro-
pean Parliament with new legislative powers and by removing the need for 
unanimity within the Council of Ministers from those decisions related to 
the single market. 
The new cooperation procedure granted the EP the right to a second read-
ing of all Community legislation relating to the establishment and function-
ing of the internal market, to social and economic cohesion, to technologi-
cal research and development, and to certain aspects of social and regional 
policies. Valeria Marziali 
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The strengthening of the EP and the broadening of its competences contin-
ued some years later when the Treaty of Maastricht introduced in some 
matters the co-decision procedure and re-balanced the Council-EP relation-
ship by attributing to the latter the power to fully participate in the EU de-
cision-making process. As a consequence, the Parliament was given the 
right to reject legislation. 
Before the SEA entered into force and before the strengthening of the pow-
ers of the EP, the Council of Ministers enjoyed a crucial position within the 
legislative process: it was the only target of interest groups and there was 
just one route of lobbying, namely the national route via national govern-
ments. 
Following the introduction by the SEA of the Qualified Majority Voting 
(QMV) system, national governments have progressively lost their veto 
power and their influence in the decision-making process. This has also had 
an effect on the lobbying process and has given rise to the development of 
a second route of interest representation: interest groups have started to put 
pressure on the Commission and the Parliament and no longer only on na-
tional cabinets. 
The presence of two different and complementary ways of organising lob-
bying is due to the presence of both supranational (Commission, EP and 
European Court of Justice) and intergovernmental (Council of Ministers 
and European Council) institutions; furthermore, lobbying must, in order to 
be successful, reflect in its strategies and techniques the institutional archi-
tecture and the political system that it turns to. 
2.1  The Council of Ministers 
There are two channels that interest groups follow to ensure that their 
views are represented in the Council meetings: either by lobbying the na-
tional representatives of the home government and of other Member States 
or the staff of the Council itself. These ways are complementary and do not 
exclude each other. 
Since everything is already decided when ministers are called to vote, lob-
byists should try to intervene in the earliest phases of the examination of a Lobbying in Brussels 
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directive or a regulation by the Council. This is the reason why interest 
groups prefer to lobby the Permanent Representations to the EU: diplomats 
serve their governments as members of the COREPER, whereas civil ser-
vants participate in the Council working groups and prepare the ground for 
meetings of COREPER and ministerial Councils. 
Lobbyists should also target the civil servants of the Council’s Secretariat-
General and the staff of each presidency. In fact, the government that holds 
the 6-months presidency of the Council of Ministers and of the European 
Council is responsible for setting the political agenda and for coordinating 
the activities of these two bodies. As a result, it is fundamental for interest 
groups to address their lobbying towards the Permanent Representation of 
the country that holds the presidency, since this body is the trait d’union 
with the national cabinet. 
Lobbying the Council goes beyond the attempt to influence the positions by 
national governments: in order to form coalitions either to pass a proposal 
or to block it, it turns also to other governments. In fact, as a consequence 
of the QMV system, interest groups are encouraged to put pressure on other 
executives than only on the national ones if they are not able to convince 
national ministers to adopt their position or if their points of view differ. In 
addition, the influence of a national government over the adoption of a par-
ticular measure is reduced because of the QMV system. 
Another element that characterises lobbying on the Council is the type of 
information this body needs in order to legislate: differently from the 
Commission, which looks for detailed and technical knowledge, the Coun-
cil is interested in what can facilitate the bargaining process among Mem-
ber States. 
Despite its crucial role within the decisional process, lobbying the Council 
is neither easy nor completely accessible: its meetings are secret and closed 
and interest groups have no direct access to it. 
Though it may seem difficult to lobby national governments and despite the 
increasing role of the supranational institutions vis-à-vis the Council in the 
EU decisional framework, the role of Member States still remains funda-
mental and lobbying through national channels determinant: as a result, in-Valeria Marziali 
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terest groups should continue to try to persuade their home government to 
adopt a certain proposal and to defend it within the Council of Ministers 
because what matters in the end of the process is what the minister votes
11.  
Small firms and interest groups, which have insufficient resources and staff 
to open an office in Brussels, find this national route, which takes place in 
the respective capitals, easier. Moreover, one should not forget that national 
governments respond directly to their Parliaments and to their electors of 
the positions taken within the Council: they gain politically from sponsor-
ing domestic interest groups as the latter in the future will be grateful to the 
government in terms of political support. 
2.2  The European Commission 
Having the right to initiate legislation by drafting proposals to submit both 
to the Council and to the MEPs, the Commission plays the role of agenda 
setter and it is considered to be the driving force in the EU’s institutional 
system. 
The Treaties envisaged three main functions for this body: drafter of legis-
lation; guardian of the Treaties and of the acquis communautaire; and exe-
cuter of policies and actions of the Union. Moreover, since trade policy is 
an exclusive competence of the EU, not only the Commission leads the ne-
gotiations within the World Trade Organisation (WTO) on behalf of the 
European Union, but it handles all the cooperation agreements with third 
countries. 
As far as the first competence is concerned, no directive or regulation can 
be elaborated or passed without the proposal by the Commission. Being the 
institution responsible for the protection of European interests, the Com-
mission has to be independent from the Member States and is required to 
pursue the priorities of the Union and of the citizens in general rather than 
of a particular economic sector, professional category or country. To do so, 
 
11 Cf. Grant Wyn, ‘Pressure Groups and the European Community: An Overview’, in 
Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.  Lobbying in Brussels 
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it needs to consult national governments and bureaucracies, business sec-
tors, trade unions, experts and academic advisors. 
Its competences and the crucial role that it plays within the institutional ar-
chitecture of the EU make the Commission the foremost target for interest 
representation. Expert knowledge is the critical resource for the Commis-
sion’s legislative work: since it has to write technical and expertise-based 
proposals, the Commission needs help from external groups and is open to 
them. 
Being interested in policy inputs and in practical as well as technical sug-
gestions, particularly since the implementation of the single market in the 
mid-1980s, when it needed the support of the business community and 
economic actors, the Commission has sponsored the building of a system 
of stable consultation. More than 1,000 committees and expert groups give 
assistance in the preparation, adoption and enforcement of regulations and 
directives. Through these bodies interest groups can promote their point of 
view, negotiate with the other groups, and even influence the Commission; 
besides, since the drafted text is sent both to the Council and the Parliament 
to be examined, amended if necessary, and finally approved, lobbyists can 
indirectly affect the Council as well
12. 
Even if it comprises 16,000 officials
13, the EU bureaucracy suffers from 
understaffing and budget constraints because it is relatively small if com-
pared to national administrations. 
Its openness to consultation is mainly due to the necessity of a large con-
sensus among those parties interested in a particular policy area: what is 
then important in the eyes of the Commission is not only the drafting 
phase, but also, and even more so, the next stage, that is to say, the imple-
mentation of EU legislation in the Member States. To put it differently, the 
Commission has to make sure that a particular measure is accepted by the 
stakeholders: as Martin Donnelly has stated, «the Commission […] needs 
external allies if it is to ensure that the policy proposals agreed through its 
 
12 Cf. Stefania Panebianco, Il lobbying europeo, Milano: Giuffrè Editore, 2000. 
13 One fifth of the Commission’ staff is employed in translation and interpreting ser-
vices. Valeria Marziali 
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complex internal co-ordination process are to be successfully translated 
into Community law»
14. 
Interest groups resort to different ways of lobbying the Commission: they 
can address their activity to those officials who write a particular proposal 
that concerns their field of action; otherwise they can turn their attention 
and efforts directly to the Commissioner who is in charge of the matter to 
which lobbyists are interested in. In addition, they can try to convince the 
Commissioner of their own nationality to put pressure on the College to 
adopt a certain measure. 
Lobbying the Commission starts from lobbying the Commissioners’ cabi-
nets, because the staff follows all the issues and are in continuous contact 
with the members of the Commission. 
2.3  The European Parliament 
Elected every five years by direct universal suffrage, the European Parlia-
ment is the expression of the democratic will of the Union’s citizens. It has 
substantial budgetary powers and is responsible, with the Council, for deci-
sions on the majority of European Union legislation. 
Unlike national assemblies, the EP has neither a defined majority nor a 
proper opposition: not only do the majorities vary depending on the matters 
involved, but party families, such as the socialists and the Christian democ-
rats, register within themselves national and ideological orientations. 
Over the decades and thanks to some important revisions of the Treaties, 
the Parliament has gained more and more powers and competences and has 
positioned itself at the centre of the EU decisional process. 
Being conscious of this institutional change, interest groups have built a 
more complex lobbying strategy: no longer only aimed at making pressure 
on the Commission in the initial phase of the legislative process, but also at 
the Parliament stage, when proposals can be amended. 
 
14 See Martin Donnelly, ‘The Structure of the European Commission and the Policy 
Formation Process’, in Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the 
European Community, op. cit., p. 81. Lobbying in Brussels 
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It exercises an important function of scrutiny and control over the activity 
of the other institutions thanks to its prerogatives above all in the budgetary 
field; however, it does not legislate autonomously, but it co-decides on the 
basis of the proposals drafted by the Commission and approved later on by 
the Council. Hence, in all the cases where legislative power is shared be-
tween the Council and the Parliament under co-decision, lobbying of the 
EP may be crucial. 
The Parliament has constituted a point of reference for many groups, such 
as environmentalists, consumers and social interests, which may not have 
enjoyed such easy access to the Commission or national governments. 
Lobbying the Parliament starts when the rapporteur, who is the member of 
the parliamentary committee responsible for examining a new measure and 
reporting on it, begins to write the report before the committee and party 
groups start discussing it. This is the reason why the most important people 
to lobby are the rapporteur and the chairman of the committee that exam-
ines the proposal of the Commission. Given their relevance, some interest 
groups try to influence the  appointment of certain MEPs as rapporteurs on 
subjects in which they are known to be helpful. 
As they offer the opportunity to hear experts, special standing committees 
are more accessible to interest groups than the plenary session and they 
represent the best place to convince MEPs to amend the legislative text un-
der review. 
There are other ways to lobby the EP: by addressing leaders of party 
groups, especially those of the two biggest groups – PES and EEP –, so that 
they give voting instructions to their colleagues both within the committees 
and the assembly; and through the intergroups, that is to say, semi-official 
committees where parliamentarians belonging to different party groups 
meet to exchange information and talk about particular issue areas. 
3.  The Reasons for Lobbying 
The lobbying activity is not only a way for lobbyists to bring to the atten-
tion of EU policy-makers the priorities of the associations they represent, Valeria Marziali 
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but it is also a mechanism through which the EU political bodies and ad-
ministration can gain information. 
Lobbying in the EU results to be necessary, and in some circumstances 
even vital, for the policy-making process as well as for the implementation 
of policies. Therefore, what is fundamental is the exchange of information, 
both under the form of political input and technical suggestions especially 
towards the Commission, and the feedback and support that the institutions 
receive from interest groups. 
3.1  The institutional structure of the EU 
The European Union is built on an institutional system that is the only one 
of its kind in the world: Member States delegate sovereignty for certain 
matters to independent institutions, which represent the interests of the Un-
ion as a whole, its member countries, and its citizens. While the Commis-
sion traditionally upholds the interests of the Union as a whole, each na-
tional government is represented within the Council and citizens directly 
elect the members of the European Parliament. This ‘institutional triangle’ 
governs the EU together with the Court of Justice and the Court of Audi-
tors. 
The institutional multi-level governance structure that the Treaties 
established is neither a federal state nor a state in the traditional European 
sense, but an organisation that on the one hand is still dominated by na-
tional governments and on the other hand is governed by supranational au-
thorities. 
What distinguishes the EU is the fragmented character of its institutional 
system due to multiple levels of policy-making and to the diffusion of 
power between its constituent parties. This makes the system easily acces-
sible to interest groups as there is almost an infinite number of access 
points through which they can get in contact with the EU authorities. As a 
consequence, there is no shortage, but an over-supply, of potential routes of 
influence. On the one hand this can constitute an advantage, but on the Lobbying in Brussels 
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other hand it can become a disadvantage because of the plurality of actors 
and the complexity of the decision-making process
15. 
3.2  The ‘information deficit’ of the EU institutions 
Lobbying in the European Union plays a double role: on the one hand, it is 
an instrument for interest groups to represent the priorities of their associ-
ates and to influence the decisional process; on the other hand, it constitutes 
an important and decisive remedy for the so-called ‘information deficit’ 
suffered by the EU institutions. 
In order to explain how the information exchange works, which actors are 
involved and what kind of information they provide each other, Pieter 
Bouwen has presented the theory of demand and supply of access goods
16. 
According to his theory, what is crucial in the whole EU decision-making 
system is information: the whole lobbying process can be described as be-
ing a market where the access good at stake is information. Hence, like 
every market, also this one implies that someone asks something and 
someone else provides it in exchange of something else: whereas the EU 
bodies need information to carry out their activities, interest groups need to 
have access to these institutions to influence their decisions. Both sides 
gain since the latter acquire the information and expertise they need to for-
mulate the policies, while the former get in contact with policy-makers. 
Nevertheless, the private actors supply the access goods if the access good 
is demanded by that institution. Besides, not all access goods play the same 
role and have the same relevance: it goes without saying that the criticality 
of an access good for the functioning of an EU institution determines the 
degree of access that the institution will grant to the private sector’s group. 
Once having made clear that access to the institutions does not necessarily 
mean influence on them but that, however, gaining access to the EU institu-
tions is a conditio sine qua non to exert influence within the EU legislative 
 
15 Cf. European Parliament, Directorate-General for Research, Working Paper, Lobby-
ing in the European Union: Current Rules and Practices, Luxembourg: Publica-
tions Service, 2003. Valeria Marziali 
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process, Bouwen has listed three kinds of information the EU needs: Expert 
Knowledge, information about the European Encompassing Interest (EEI), 
and information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). 
Expert knowledge is the expertise and technical know-how required by the 
EU from the private sector to understand the market; in other words, EU 
officials may need precise information in developing effective legislation in 
a particular policy area. As far as information about the EEI is concerned, it 
is required from the private sector in the field of the internal market. Fi-
nally, the last kind of information concerns the aggregated needs and inter-
ests of a sector in the domestic market. To put it differently, Expert Knowl-
edge involves single private actors such as individual firms; information 
about the EEI concerns an association that is spokesperson of the interests 
of a particular category at the European level; on the contrary, information 
about the DEI has to do with national markets. 
The Commission needs Expert Knowledge for its legislative work and in-
formation about the European Encompassing Interest to identify common 
EU interests and to monitor the compliance of Member States with their 
Treaties obligations. 
On the other hand, the European Parliament needs both information about 
the EEI and that one about the DEI. In fact, if on the one side the MEPs 
look for information that allows them to assess the legislative proposal 
made by the Commission, on the other side they want to retain links with 
their electorates back home. To do so, they need information about national 
political constituencies. 
Being composed by national ministers who are interested in the reaction of 
their own electorates to EU decisions, the Council requires information 
about the Domestic Encompassing Interest. However, Bouwen has stressed 
that the Secretariat and the Presidency of the Council, in order to carry out 
their tasks, need information about the EEI. 
 
16 Cf. Pieter Bouwen, Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: Towards a Theory 
of Access, Firenze: EUI (Working Paper SPS), 5, 2001. Lobbying in Brussels 
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In sum, which are the critical resources of each institution according to 
Bouwen’s theory? Expert knowledge for the Commission, information 
about the EEI for the Parliament, and information about the DEI for the 
Council. 
In conclusion, interest groups obtain access if they provide the access 
goods. However, the same access goods have to be demanded simultane-
ously by the EU institution to which the private actors want to gain access. 
Private actors should provide the highest quality and quantity of the critical 
access good in the most efficient way in order to get the highest degree of 
access to the EU institution. 
3.3  The increase in the EU competences 
As already stated in the previous chapters, over the decades, and particu-
larly since the Single European Act of the mid-1980s, the EU has become 
more and more relevant for regulating the market. At the same time it has 
achieved competences in other matters and has started to legislate more ef-
ficiently and rapidly thanks to the QMV system. 
The broadening of competences has meant that the EU has gained power to 
decide and to allocate resources: one can think at millions of Euro of struc-
tural funds that are managed and distributed in Brussels in favour of the 
Member States. 
Moreover, the EU has extended its sphere of influence at the detriment of 
national parliaments: since EU laws and justice take precedence over the 
laws passed by the Member States, no group can afford to ignore legisla-
tion drafted and approved in Brussels. 
4.  Some Tactics of Successful Lobbying 
Since access is not given to all interest groups because of their high number 
and because the institutions have time constraints to reach a compromise, 
interest groups should prepare their lobbying in order to make it more con-
vincing than that of the others. This means that lobbying has to be profes-Valeria Marziali 
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sional rather than unrehearsed and to resort to some strategies and tech-
niques. 
Nevertheless, even if lobbying in the strict sense of the word is the pressure 
exerted on government bodies, this phase represents the last step of the 
whole process: before addressing their questions, lobbyists should consult 
their associates, collect information, elaborate one or more proposals on the 
basis of it, and form alliances. 
Moreover, lobbying is not only about influencing or changing public pol-
icy, but also knowing what is going on: as a result, interest groups should 
be always up-to-date and ready to act. 
4.1  Factual, clear and brief information 
The theory of demand and supply of access goods by Bouwen has shown 
that the relevance of information influences the degree of access given to a 
particular interest group and affects both its reputation and its reliability. If 
it offers good information, it is more likely that the bureaucracy of Brussels 
will ask again help and assistance and will grant access. 
Scholars and lobbyists have used different adjectives to define how infor-
mation should be: factual, concise, precise, brief, specific and scientific, so 
that the more targeted to the objective, the more relevant at the eyes of the 
EU it becomes. 
In order to carry out a successful lobbying, lobbyists should not focus just 
on the position of their own groups: as the final result of the legislative 
process will be a compromise among all the interests at stake and the insti-
tutions involved, lobbyists should be ready to bargain and to modify their 
view. Besides, they may need to set up an ad hoc organisation to present a 
certain alliance aimed at influencing a particular issue. Not only does this 
imply the preparation of a coherent strategy that avoids that more groups 
express the same view in different words vis-à-vis the EU institutions, but 
also that they have to review and take into account the ideas of other key 
European interest groups on the same and related issues. 
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4.2  The ‘meta-game of triple P’: persons, positions, procedures 
In order to describe the best situation for making lobbying effective and to 
stress that what matters is which buttons one pushes, M.P.C.M. van 
Schendelen has provided the so-called ‘meta-game of triple P’: persons, 
positions, procedures. It consists in trying to place the friendliest persons in 
the best positions in the most beneficial procedures. 
If the representatives of an interest group have friends who work at the DG 
of the Commission that drafts a particular directive or regulation concern-
ing that specific group and if they share with these EU officials values, in-
terests and even nationality, this can constitute an advantage for that lobby 
association. 
The interest group should also be interested in acquiring crucial positions in 
the decision-making process such as chairman or rapporteur of the consul-
tative committees or of the expert groups established by the Commission. 
Finally, interest groups should look at which procedure is applied to pass a 
certain Community act: not only can one manipulate the issue and change 
the procedure, but co-decision is different from the consultation of the 
European Parliament as well as the application of the QMV system differs 
from unanimity. Van Schendelen has made the example of Commission’s 
proposals about taxation: if they are reframed as open market measures, 
they do not need anymore the unanimous voting in the Council. It is essen-
tially a question of interpretation
17. 
Experts and officials at a lower level write most legislation. In many cases 
these experts are the main starting point because they turn out to be funda-
mental since after their drafting any modification to the original text will be 
difficult. As a consequence, it is necessary to make pressure on them rather 
than waiting that the Council or the Parliament can effectively intervene. 
 
17 Cf. M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels: the Art of Lobbying the 
EU, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2002.  Valeria Marziali 
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According to James Gardner, lobby associations need «to find the Eurocrat 
working on a problem or subject area at the lowest possible level»
18. 
People to be lobbied should be approached on the basis of issues and not on 
the basis of political sympathy: as far as national politicians elected in the 
EP are concerned, they should be addressed irrespectively of the political 
party to which they belong, but taking into consideration their interest in a 
particular issue. 
What is more, lobbying has to be done at all the decisional levels and 
should take advantage of the presence of a member of the group in the de-
cisional process such as in the consultative committees and in the commit-
tees of experts set up by the Commission. These bodies are obviously the 
best place where groups can have a say and give the view of the future ad-
dressees of the Community initiatives. 
4.3 The  right  timing 
The earlier an interest group intervenes in the legislative process, the more 
effective it is. However, the “rapidity” with which it acts does not involve 
only the action of pressure, but it implies also the necessity of building re-
lationships: it has to schedule introductory meetings with officials and 
other contact persons to get to know each other, exchange views and adopt 
the right approach with every official. 
Lobbying should intervene as early as possible, in particular at the begin-
ning of the drafting process and before the publication of the proposal: in 
fact, civil servants of the Commission cannot be in charge of detailed ex-
pertise on each and every topic, so they need assistance immediately, and 
because later on it will be more difficult to modify the proposal. As Robert 
Hull has pointed out, «95 per cent of lobbying takes place at the stage after 
 
18 See James N. Gardner, Effective Lobbying in the European Community, Deventer: 
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1991, p. 70. The italics are in the original 
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the proposal has been through the process of drafting within the Commis-
sion»
19. 
To be successful lobbyists must be up-to-date and informed about the EU 
policy-making: the principal sources of information are the Official Jour-
nal, the regular reports issued by the Commission or the Parliament, the 
Green or White Papers, finally the annual legislative programme of the 
Commission. However, they have to pay attention also to the presidencies 
of the Council and of the European Council that can modify the political 
agenda. 
The follow-up stage should not be underestimated: interest groups have to 
follow up every letter they write, every contact they make, and every initia-
tive they take. 
4.4  A summary of successful techniques 
The lobbying process can be divided in different phases: fact-finding, 
analysis, influencing, and follow-up. 
At the beginning it is necessary to gather information and to build an in-
formation network within EU associations that can alert if a proposal is go-
ing to be drafted. Then, interest groups should monitor what the institutions 
are doing and are going to do, that is to say, they should go through the 
agenda in order to match it with the own priorities. Finally, they communi-
cate with policy-makers and attempt to influence them. 
As van Schendelen has observed, «the puzzle for EU public affairs man-
agement is to find the optimal selection, the best connection, the right tim-
ing and the correct approach»
20. To put it another way, ‘how to get the right 
information to the right person at the right time’. 
Being mindful of his personal experience as Commission official, Hull has 
drawn the prototype of successful lobbyists: having «perceived that the pol-
icy-making in the Community is at the same time diffuse and yet more 
 
19 See Robert Hull, ‘Lobbying Brussels: A View from Within’, in Sonia Mazey and 
Jeremy Richardson (eds.), Lobbying in the European Community, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 83. Valeria Marziali 
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open than in most national administrations»
21 and that «the Community is 
sui generis and not to be approached as if it were a national administration 
or the US White House»
22, they «begin their contacts on an issue when leg-
islation is little more then a gleam in an official’s eye»
23. 
Last but not least, cultural and national differences have to be taken into 
account, namely in approaching MEPs coming from different countries and 
speaking different languages. 
To summarise, which are the best tactics to lobby effectively the European 
Union? What is considered essential is to have a clearly defined strategy 
based upon what to look for, whom to ask, and how to achieve it. This re-
quires: to gather as much sound and accurate information as possible; to 
develop long-term or permanent relations with the authorities concerned; to 
find out who is drafting an item, that is to say, to identify the right ‘Euro-
crat’ in the Commission; to be well prepared for meetings; to present own 
positions with brevity and clarity; to be aware of all sides of the argument; 
to keep all viable channels of communications open; to know the system 
and how to entry to the decision-making process, i.e. to know the legisla-
tive process and its procedures, especially the QMV system in the case of 
the Council; finally, to follow the next stages
24. 
5. The European Commission and the Interest Groups 
Consultation with interest groups is not the only form of interaction be-
tween the EU and the outside society: on the one hand, MEPs are the 
elected representatives of the citizens of Europe; on the other hand, the 
Treaties provide the Commission with some other duties regarding consul-
tation. 
 
20 See M. P. C. M. van Schendelen, Machiavelli in Brussels, op. cit., p. 98. 
21 See Robert Hull, ‘Lobbying Brussels: A View from Within’, op. cit., p. 87. 
22 Ibid., p. 92. 
23 Ibid., p. 87. 
24 Cf. Justin Greenwood, Representing interests in the European Union, London: 
Macmillan, New York: St. Martins press, 1997.  Lobbying in Brussels 
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The Protocol No. 7 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality annexed to the Amsterdam Treaty, for instance, stipulates 
that «the Commission should […] consult widely before proposing legisla-
tion, and, whenever appropriate, publish consultation documents». More-
over, with regard to the two institutionalised advisory bodies, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, the 
Commission consults them according to the specific consultation frame-
work provided in the Treaties. Finally, article 47 of the Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe sets out the general principles of participatory 
democracy in the EU. In particular, it states that «the institutions shall 
maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with representative as-
sociations and civil society»
25 and adds that «the Commission shall carry 
out broad consultations with parties concerned in order to ensure that the 
Union’s actions are coherent and transparent»
26. 
5.1  The approach of the Commission towards consultation 
The start of the Communication An Open and Structured Dialogue Be-
tween the Commission and Special Interest Groups, published by the Euro-
pean Commission in December 1992, summarises the positive attitude of 
this institution towards consultation and interest representation: 
the Commission has always been an institution open to outside input. The Com-
mission believes this process to be fundamental to the development of its poli-
cies. This dialogue has proved valuable to both the Commission and to interested 
outside parties. Commission officials acknowledge the need for such outside in-
put and welcome it
27. 
This document envisaged some guiding principles in order to define the 
Commission’s relations with interest groups: confirmation of the open rela-
tionship between the former and the latter on the basis of open administra-
tion; the equal treatment accorded by the Commission to all interest groups, 
 
25 Article 47, par. 2. 
26 Article 47, par. 3. 
27 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, An Open and Structured Dialogue 
Between the Commission and Special Interest Groups, SEC (1992), 2272 final.  
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so that «every interested party, irrespective of size or financial backing, 
should not be denied the opportunity of being heard by the Commission»; 
finally, while dealing with representatives of special interest groups, the 
requirement by Commission officials to know exactly ‘who is who’ and 
‘who does what’. 
In this Communication the Commission opted for a self-regulation policy 
by inviting the interest groups to adopt their own codes of conduct on the 
basis of the minimal criteria as listed in Annex II to the Communication.  
With regard to this, since they «are best placed to establish and enforce 
codes of conduct», «the Commission feels that special interest groups have 
to be given a chance to organize themselves freely and without interference 
from the public sector». In this way, the Commission encouraged lobbyists 
to create a professional body and suggested the establishment of one or 
more organisations of interest groups as a means of communication with 
the Commission. 
However, some minimal requirements were defined: to deal with the 
Commission with honesty and competence; to declare the name of the cli-
ent for whom lobbyists work; neither to seek to employ officials who work 
for the Commission nor to offer them any form of inducement or gift in 
order to obtain information or to receive special treatment; finally, not to 
sell confidential documents of the Commission for profit
28. 
As the rules aimed at disciplining accreditation and registration, they did 
not exist and the Commission preferred not to set them up: on the contrary, 
it decided to continue neither granting privileges to special interest groups, 
such as the issuing of entry passes and favoured access to information, nor 
giving associations an official endorsement by recognising them consulta-
tive status. 
In 2001 the ‘Working group 2a’, entrusted with the task to write a report on 
‘Consultation and Participation of Civil Society’ in view of the publication 
by the Commission of the White Paper on Governance, made clear the idea 
 
28 Cf. also Andrew M. McLaughlin and Justin Greenwood, ‘The Management of Inter-
est Representation in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33, 
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that coherent and transparent consultation processes contribute to increase 
the accountability of the EU institutions. However, even if interest groups 
provide valuable expertise, wide support and social acceptance for deci-
sions, the political sphere of legitimacy results unquestionable: only the 
Council and the Parliament have the power to take decisions and are politi-
cally responsible for them
29. As remarked by the White Paper, «better con-
sultation complements, and does not replace, decision-making by the Insti-
tutions»
30. 
The Communication Towards a reinforced culture of consultation and dia-
logue – General principles and minimum standards for consultation of in-
terested parties by the Commission, issued by the Commission in Decem-
ber 2002, emphasized again that legitimacy of the European Union lies in 
the Council and in the Parliament. 
Though it recognised that «every individual citizen, enterprise or associa-
tion will continue to be able to provide the Commission with input»
31 and 
that «there is no contradiction between wide consultation and the concept 
of representative democracy»
32, the Communication concluded that «the 
guiding principle for the Commission is therefore to give interested parties 
a voice, but not a vote»
33. 
This document of 2002 reaffirmed that consultation can contribute both to 
improve the quality of the policy outcome and to broaden the involvement 
of interested parties. 
 
 
 
29 Cf. Commission of the European Communities, White Paper on European Govern-
ance – Report of Working Group ‘Consultation and Participation of Civil Society’, 
2001. 
30 See Commission of the European Communities, European Governance. A White 
Paper, COM (2001), 428 final, p. 16. 
31 See Commission of the European Communities, Towards a reinforced culture of 
consultation and dialogue – General principles and minimum standards for consul-
tation of interested parties by the Commission, COM (2002), 704 final, p. 11. 
32 Ibid., p. 4. 
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5.2  The ‘European Transparency Initiative’ 
Giving a speech at ‘The European Foundation for Management’ of the Not-
tingham Business School, Siim Kallas, Vice-President of the European 
Commission and Commissioner for Administrative Affairs, Audit and 
Anti-Fraud, launched the so-called ‘European Transparency Initiative’ on 3 
March 2005. 
Aimed at enhancing transparency throughout the European Union, this ini-
tiative is based on the idea that transparency is needed for the proper func-
tioning of the decision-making process, for gaining the trust of the public, 
and for helping policy-makers to refrain from fraud and abuse of public 
money. 
The ‘European Transparency Initiative’ will contribute to increase financial 
accountability of the EU with regard to its budget and to strengthen per-
sonal integrity and institutional independence. In other words, its goals are 
to increase openness and accessibility of EU institutions, raise awareness 
over the use of the EU budget, i.e. taxpayers’ money, and make the Union’s 
institutions more accountable to the public. 
As far as personal integrity and institutional independence, Kallas made 
reference to the 15,000 lobbyists who work in Brussels and asked for more 
transparency, openness and respect of high ethical standards in carrying out 
their professional activity. 
Owing to their role as representatives of particular interests and to the im-
pact that their lobbying has on Community legislation, 
people are allowed to know who they are, what they do and what they stand for. 
There is nothing wrong with lobbies because each decision-making process 
needs proper information from different angles. […] But transparency is lacking. Lobbying in Brussels 
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With regard to NGOs, on the other hand, the Vice-President of the Euro-
pean Commission stressed the necessity to increase transparency in the use 
of the money that these organisations receive from the Commission
34. 
In a speech given on 20 October 2005 Kallas confirmed the ideas illus-
trated in March: increasing transparency can help to restore confidence of 
EU citizens in the EU, so that they are able to know how and why decisions 
are taken, and to strengthen the legitimacy of the institutions. In particular, 
a transparent system is open to dialogue with the interested parties and pro-
duces sound policies. However, not only are the EU institutions called to 
more transparency, but also the lobby organisations which work in Brus-
sels
35. 
In November 2005 in a Communication to the College the President Bar-
roso and the Commissioners Wallström, Kallas, Hübner and Fischer Boel 
reiterated the concept that transparency contributes to increase the credibil-
ity of the EU institutions and the accountability of those who distribute and 
receive EU funds. 
The Commission considers the gaining of the trust of the European public 
in the EU one of the challenges of the coming years and one of the strategic 
objectives of the College in the period 2005-2009. More particularly, the 
President Barroso and the Commissioners Wallström, Kallas, Hübner and 
Fischer Boel have proposed to set up a compulsory registration system for 
all interest groups, including lobbying associations, and have asked them to 
adhere to a common code of conduct. Finally, they have announced that a 
Green Book concerning consultation practices will be published in early 
2006
36. 
 
34 Cf. Siim Kallas, The need for a European transparency initiative, Speech held at 
‘The European Foundation for Management’, Nottingham Business School, 3 
March 2005. 
35 KALLAS, Siim, Transparency restores confidence in Europe, Speech to the Euro-
pean Policy Institutes Network at the Centre of European Policy Studies, Brussels, 
20 October 2005. 
36 Communication to the Commission from the President, Ms Wallström, Mr Kallas, 
Ms Hübner and Ms Fischer Boel proposing the launch of a European Transparency 
Initiative, adopted by the European Commission on 9 November 2005. Valeria Marziali 
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6. Lobbying and Legitimacy of the European Union 
So far it has been argued that lobbying has contributed to the process of 
European integration through the exchange of information between interest 
groups and EU institutions. Now, however, it is time to shift the focus of 
this analysis and to try to answer the following questions: does lobbying in 
Brussels constitute a remedy for the so-called ‘democratic deficit’ of the 
EU? Can interest representation be deemed a means to increase the trust of 
citizens in EU institutions? 
6.1  The ‘democratic deficit’ of the European Union 
As already pointed out in the previous chapters, the institutional structure 
of the European Union is based on intergovernmental and supranational 
elements, which give to it a double legitimacy: a direct legitimacy stems 
from the direct elections of the MEPs, whereas an indirect legitimacy de-
rives from the Member States that are signatories of the Treaties and are 
politically responsible of their action before the democratically elected re-
spective national parliaments. Moreover, scholars tend to identify a techno-
cratic and utilitarian legitimacy that depends on the capacity of the EU to 
address problems at a European level and to solve them
37. 
Although the institutional novelties that have provided the European Par-
liament with new powers and have made it co-legislator with the Council, 
according to Marcus Höreth the problem of ‘democratic deficit’ is still 
there. In fact, the Council of Ministers is not accountable to the EP and 
continues to enjoy primacy in the EU legislative process, so that the Euro-
pean Parliament cannot be considered to be a real parliament. 
The ‘democratic deficit’ stems from both the lack of a European-wide peo-
ple and of a truly European party system: not only do people continue to 
think of themselves in terms of national affiliations, but political events and 
issues at the European level are monitored by national media from an inter-
 
37 Cf. Marcus Höreth, ‘No way out for the beast? The unsolved legitimacy problem of 
European governance’, Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 2, 1999, pp. 249-268. Lobbying in Brussels 
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nal perspective as well as European elections are dominated by national 
problems. 
Even more, EU elections differ from the domestic ones as electors cannot 
sanction those who govern the EU: if on the one hand it is true that the EP 
can force the Commission as a whole to resign, on the other hand it is as 
much true that the Commission does not have any political colour as it 
happens in the case of national executives. 
6.2  The impact of lobbying on the legitimacy of the EU 
Two different kinds of legitimacy of the European Union can be identified: 
input and output legitimacy. The former concerns the democratic decision-
making at the European level, so that a bigger involvement of citizens and 
interested groups can provide a higher legitimacy to the system. The output 
legitimacy, on the contrary, regards the EU’s general efficiency and effec-
tiveness in dealing with issues, that is to say, its ability to achieve the citi-
zens’ goals and to solve their problems. The more the EU is effective, the 
more likely it is accepted by citizens as an important political actor: it 
raises both their confidence in the institutions and the accountability of the 
latter vis-à-vis the citizens themselves
38. 
By and large scholars argue that interest groups increase both kinds of le-
gitimacy. On the one hand they constitute the ‘natural constituency’ of the 
Commission and Parliament who can rely on their information; on the other 
hand, they promote European integration as they persuade national gov-
ernments to consent to broad EU competences and they contribute to le-
gitimise the EU in the eyes of the citizens. 
If Justin Greenwood has observed that «organized interests have histori-
cally been an important means of contact for EU central institutions that are 
remote and lacking in democratic legitimacy»
39, for Bernard O’Connor the 
 
38 With regard to the distinction between input and output legitimacy see also Pieter 
Bouwen, Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: Towards a Theory of Access, 
Firenze: EUI (Working Paper SPS), 5, 2001. 
39 See Justin Greenwood, Interest representation in the European Union, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 5. Valeria Marziali 
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open question of the ‘democratic deficit’ can be partially tackled by the di-
rect representation by interest groups
40. 
Interest groups play also the role of replacing the lacking European-wide 
political representation: European political groups do not always effec-
tively represent the different European problems and in some cases they do 
not even perceive them because they are too far from the grassroots. Inter-
est groups, on the contrary, especially trade federations and European asso-
ciations, can bring truly European priorities to the attention of the EU insti-
tutions. 
Whereas political representation is weak, interest representation is strong 
and effective. However, in Europe there is no link between political parties 
and interest groups in terms of involvement of the latter in electoral cam-
paigns; this may seem a contradiction, but it is due to the negative idea that 
prevails in Europe with regard to lobbying. 
Lobbying has also contributed to the affirmation of an independent political 
system from that of the Member States and has increased the autonomy of 
the EU over the interests of national governments. This is the reason why 
Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen have underlined that the «Europe-
anization and lobbyfication of EU decision-making»
41 has been one of the 
main consequences of the Single European Act. 
Although this work has repeatedly stated that lobbying activity and the 
European Union are interdependent and that above all the latter needs the 
former to carry out its actions and policies, the role of lobbying should not 
be overestimated. In fact, if on the one hand nobody can question the idea 
that lobbying is not a danger to democracy, on the other hand it is neces-
sary to point the finger at those aspects that still show some shortcomings. 
Not only what Commissioner Kallas has highlighted, i.e. the lack of trans-
 
40 Cf. Bernard O’Connor, Some basic Ideas on Decision making and lobbying in the 
European Union, Castellanza: Liuc, 1997. 
41 See Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen, ‘Informal processes: lobbying, actor 
strategies, coalitions and dependencies’, in Svein S. Andersen and Kjell A. Eliassen 
(eds.), Making Policy in Europe, second edition, London – Thousand Oaks – New 
Delhi: SAGE, 2001, p. 44. Lobbying in Brussels 
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parency particularly by profit-making organisations, but also that not all 
interest groups are heard by the Commission. 
In conclusion, does lobbying in Brussels bring benefits to the EU’s political 
and administrative system? The answer cannot be entirely affirmative, be-
cause otherwise it would disregard the questions that are still open ended. 
However, one can argue, together with Andrew M. McLaughlin and Justin 
Greenwood, that «interest representation brings more advantages for EU 
institutions – in terms of providing information, carrying issues between 
institutions, selling EU policies to national authorities and legitimating the 
policy process – than disadvantages»
42. 
As far as the questions raised at the beginning of this section are concerned, 
the problem of ‘democratic deficit’ is closely related to the institutional 
structure drawn by the Treaties and, as a consequence, the Treaties them-
selves should put an end to this drawback. The lack of accountability of the 
Council of Ministers vis-à-vis the EP cannot be replaced merely by more 
participation of interest groups in the legislative process. 
On the contrary, lobbying can continue to be a means to increase the trust 
of the citizens in EU institutions. If citizens feel the EU a far away institu-
tional complex, they do not know how it works and what it does, interest 
groups can represent a sort of transmission belt between “Brussels” and the 
European peoples. What is more, the Commission without interest groups 
would not be able to comply with the duty of legislative initiative envis-
aged by the Treaties. 
It is difficult to contest the idea maintained by the Commission and re-
ported in the fifth part that lobbying does not affect the legitimacy of the 
EU policies since they are thought, elaborated, adopted and implemented 
according to the Treaties and involve the ‘institutional triangle’. Neverthe-
less, saying that interest groups contribute to increase this legitimacy is not 
equivalent to questioning the legal framework of the EU: it is obvious that 
policies adopted in Brussels are legitimate on their own because they are 
 
42 See Andrew M. McLaughlin and Justin Greenwood, ‘The Management of Interest 
Representation in the European Union’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 33, 1, 
1995, p. 154. Valeria Marziali 
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taken by abiding by the rules, but it is as much evident that they would be 
less legitimate if there were no consultations with civil society. 
Legitimacy not only implies respect for the rules, but also the perception 
that the addressees of these decisions have of them: if a policy seems to be 
imposed or it is incomprehensible and unknown, it may mean that it lacks 
the necessary legitimacy. 
Conclusions 
This paper has tried to describe the lobbying activity within the European 
Union and to highlight its pros and cons. 
Although the sixth section has already drawn some conclusions with re-
spect to the relationship between lobbying, ‘democratic deficit’ and legiti-
macy of the EU, some elements that characterise the European process of 
interest representation can be summed up. 
Firstly, lobbying in the EU developed during the 1980s when Member 
States agreed to launch the SEA to complete the single market. As a conse-
quence of the broader sphere of competences achieved by the European 
institutions, interest groups started to lobby them in order to influence deci-
sions and policies. Over the decades the lobbying activity has tried to adapt 
itself and its tactics to the changing institutional system: not only have in-
terest groups turned their attention to the EP, but also new actors such as 
the Regions have started to put pressure on the EU. 
Secondly, lobbying has constituted a benefit both for the EU and for inter-
est groups: the latter have provided the policy-makers with information and 
suggestions, both of political and technical nature, and support for sponsor-
ing all over the EU the policies agreed in Brussels. They have been an im-
portant transmission belt between the decision-makers and the stake-
holders, so that they have promoted the European integration among the 
citizens and partially substituted the political parties in representing the in-
terests of the EU peoples. On the other hand, companies, associations and 
NGOs as well as Regions have taken advantage of the opportunity to influ-
ence the EU and to raise their priorities before it. Therefore, lobbying Lobbying in Brussels 
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should be looked at being a phenomenon that has enriched both sides and 
has contributed to give legitimacy to European policies. 
Thirdly, the political legitimacy of the EU is not questioned by lobbying, 
since “Brussels” is legitimised by the Treaties and the direct elections of 
the MEPs: however, interest groups have allowed a broader involvement of 
citizens and interested parties in the EU political and decisional process, so 
providing the EU policies with legitimacy and support. 
On the other side there are still questions to be solved: the lack of transpar-
ency by the public affairs consultancies and the lack of regulation for lob-
byists. 
Finally, despite the shortcomings of the system, lobbying in Brussels has 
turned out to be the combination of the necessity to give representation to 
the interests of economic, sub-national and social actors, and of the need of 
the EU for information. In other words, interest representation and need for 
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